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JURISDICTIONAL DECISIONS IN INDIAN LAW:
THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTRALEGAL FACTORS
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Philip Lee Fetzer*
It would undoubtedly surprise the average American if he were
told that his state had been taken to court by a "tribal govern-
ment," or that federal judges could base their rulings on inter-
pretations of "tribal sovereignty." Yet this is precisely the case.
During the last decade the United States Supreme Court has ruled
frequently on jurisdictional disputes between state and tribal
governments. Justices have attempted to give a contemporary
meaning to the concept of tribal sovereignty in an era of satellite
transmissions and neutron bombs. Jurisdictional decisions of the
Burger Court will be examined in the following discussion.
Background
It is important to realize that United States constitutional law
concerning Indians is "unique and separate" from the rest of
American jurisprudence.' Analogies to public lands law, civil
rights law, and general constitutional law are not necessarily ap-
propriate to 'Indian law. Indian law has evolved from certain
western European concepts of international law, from specific
sections of the United States Constitution, from treaties of both
the colonial and federal governments, and from an entire volume
of the United States Code.2
Although the Supreme Court has not given a definitive opinion
on the precise test to be used in Indian law cases, two rules have
been developed for general application to treaties, agreements,
statutes, and executive orders: they are (1) "very liberal construc-
tion to determine whether Indian rights exist" and (2) "very strict
construction to determine whether Indian rights [have been]
abrogated." 3 The rules form the basis of the canons of construc-
tion in Indian law.
© 1983 Philip Lee Fetzer
* B.A., 1965, Princeton; M.A.T., 1970, Reed; Ph.D., 1981, Oregon, Political
Science.
1. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES-A CONTINUING
QUEST FOR SURvIvAL 23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as INDIAN TRIBES].
2. Id.; 25 U.S.C. (1976).
3. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 204 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as GErcHEs).
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The principle of tribal sovereignty was first enunciated in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831.' It was then discussed in
Worcester v. Georgia the following year.' The principles of tribal
sovereignty described in Worcester "came to be accepted as
law," said Justice Black, speaking in Williams v. Lee in 1959.6
The state would have jurisdiction "where essential tribal relations
[were] not involved, and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized." 7 The Justice concluded that: "Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation In-
dians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 8
Understanding the distinctive nature of federal Indian law and
the traditional judicial interpretation of tribal sovereignty is a
necessary, yet ultimately insufficient, requirement for com-
prehending jurisdictional decisions in the last decade. It is the
thesis of this article that external factors may help explain rulings
that might otherwise prove confusing to the student of Indian
law.
That judicial decisions may reflect the extralegal situation is
not a novel idea. However, it is usually difficult to provide data
that clearly correlates with particular judicial outcomes. The lack
of consistent application of traditional Indian law canons and
concepts to the cases herein described argues strongly for ex-
planations that go beyond internal analysis of judicial logic.
HYPOTHESIS
If the Indian population directly affected by the decision is
larger than the non-Indian population within the reservation
boundaries, a majority of the Court will vote in favor of the In-
dians; otherwise, the Court majority will vote against the Indians.
My thesis is that in the last decade a majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court have made jurisdictional rulings in conflicts
between state and tribal governments by taking into account the
numbers of Indians versus the numbers of non-Indians who
would be directly affected by their decisions. In other words, de-
spite the importance of Indian law concepts, the Court may be
more concerned with numerical advantages in a given situation.
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
6. 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 220.
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The following table compares the relative numbers of Indians and
non-Indians (within the reservation boundaries) affected by
United States Supreme Court decisions in the last decade.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING INDIANS
IN JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES 9
CASE YEAR INDIAN NON- RESULTS
POPU- INDIAN FOR
LATION'0  POPU- INDIANS
LATION"
McClanahan v. Arizona 1973 131,400 8,000 Win
Tax Commission
Mattz v. Arnett 1973 1,224 600 Win
DeCoteau v. District County 1975 3,000 30,000 Loss
Court*
Moe v. Confederated 1976 2,875 12,125 Loss
Salish*
Rosebud Sioux v. Kneip* 1977 1,641 15,661 Loss
Oliphant v. Suquamish* 1978 50 2,928 Loss
Washington v. Colville* 1980 10,350 '  24,284 Loss
White Mountain Apache 1980 6,500 3,300 Win
v. Bracker
Central Machinery Co. v. 1980 8,321 1,700 Win
Arizona Tax Commission
Montana v. United States 1981 4,208 1,750 Loss
Merrion v. Jicarilla* 1982 2,100 - Win
*Population figures provided in text of opinion.
9. Population estimates based on information from HAMMONDS WORLD ATLAS
(1962); 1977 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE (1977); 1981 COMMERCIAL
ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE-FEDERAL
AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1974); GETCHES, supra note 3.
10. When the population figure for Indians was not provided in the text of the opi-
nion, the source for the population was UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
supra note 11. The latest Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates were made in 1972. It was
not possible to fairly estimate the growth of Indian population since that time. The Indian
population figures are those of the BIA from March 1972, except in the case of Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), which are from August 1969.
11. Where the non-Indian population was not provided in the text of the opinion,
estimates were made based on population figures of cities within the reservation boun-
daries based on the latest census pertinent to the case.
12. Tribal population was as follows: Colville, 3,200; Lummi, 1,250; Makah, 900;
Yakima, 5,000.
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Evidence provided herein also correlates with the argument
that a majority of the Justices will be responsive to the existence
of organized anti-Indian groups. Of the eleven decisions de-
scribed and analyzed in this article, five were won by Native
Americans. In every decision lost by Indians the case originated
in a state where anti-Indian organizations had been active.' 3 All
rulings favoring Indians were initiated in states where hostile
committees were not prominent. 4
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission
The United States Supreme Court acted unanimously in reject-
ing the application of a state income tax to an Indian whose en-
tire income was derived from reservation resources."5 Justice
Marshall spoke for the Court in the last of three Navajo cases.'
The Court held that Worcester "plainly extended to state taxa-
tion within the reservation."'I7 Nevertheless, the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty had not remained static for more than 140 years.
"[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take ac-
count of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of
non-Indians," commented Justice Marshall.'" The contemporary
cases did not rely upon "platonic notions of Indian sovereignty,"
but instead looked to the pertinent treaties and statutes that
defined the limits on state power."
Even though the Treaty of 1868 establishing the Navajo Reser-
vation had not explicitly provided that tribal members were to be
exempt friom state taxes, liberal interpretation of the treaty, along
with the tribe's tradition of independence, compelled the conclu-
sion that the reservation lands were "within the exclusive
sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision,"
said Justice Marshall.20 The tribe had won its third straight con-
test with the state of Arizona at the Supreme Court.
In all three Navajo cases, the traditional concept of tribal
sovereignty as developed by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester
13. South Dakota, Montana, and Washington.
14. Arizona, California, and New Mexico.
15. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
16. Id.; Warren v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 65 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959).
17. MeClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 169 (1973).
18. Id. at 171.
19. Id. at 172.
20. Id. at 174-75.
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could have accounted for the tribe's successes. However, the
traditional interpretations were to be frequently rejected by the
Court in later years.
Mattz v. Arnett
In this case, 2t a Yurok Indian in California appealed his con-
viction for violation of state game laws prohibiting the use of gill
nets for fishing. He alleged that his arrest and the subsequent
seizure of his fishing equipment had transpired in Indian country
and that the state had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction.2 2 The
area involved in the dispute was approximately 160 acres of
sparsely populated land in the northwestern part of the state.23
The Court unanimously reversed the California court
decision. 24 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, held that
the section 1151 definition of Indian country applied to the
disputed land. 25 The area where the arrest had taken place was
part of the old Klamath Reservation that had been opened to
homestead entry in -1892.26 The Justice decided that the reserva-
tion had not been terminated, although the House of Represen-
tatives had been hostile to its continuation as a reservation. Con-
gress was "fully aware of the means by which termination could
be effected," Justice Blackmun reasoned, but "clear termination
language" had not been used in the 1892 Act. The Justice adopted
what became known as the Mattz test. "A congressional deter-
mination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or
be clear from surrounding circumstances and legislative history,"
stated Justice Blackmun.27
21. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
22. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as follows:
[T]he term "Indian country," as used in this chapter means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States govern-
ment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way run-
ning through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.
Quoted in GETCHES, supra note 3, at 348.
23. Arnett v. 5 Gill Nets, 20 Cal. App. 3d 729, 97 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1971).
24. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 482 (1973).
25. Id. at 506 n.23.
26. Id. at 485.
27. Id. at 504-05.
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DeCoteau v. District County Court
A habeas corpus challenge to the jurisdiction of state courts in a
custody dispute had resulted in conflicting rulings by the South
Dakota Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals .28 Justice Stewart, speaking for a 6-3 majority, ruled in
favor of the state upon appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.29
Justice Stewart began by noting that 30,000 non-Indians lived
within the 1867 boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation
(where alleged offenses had occurred), whereas only about 3,000
Sioux resided therein. 0 The legislative history was "largely irrele-
vant to the issues," he said, and the jurisdictional history was
"not wholly clear," either.' Despite the foregoing evidence,
Justice Stewart decided that the face of the act, its surrounding
circumstances, and legislative history all pointed "unmistakably
to the conclusion" that the Lake Traverse Reservation had been
terminated in 1891.32
An 1889 Agreement ratified by the United States in 1891 had
provided for the cession of "all" the unallotted land of the af-
fected tribe.3 Justice Stewart believed that: "For the courts to
reinstate the entire reservation, on the theory that retention of
mere allotments was ill-advised, would carry us well beyond the
rule by which legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the
Indians." 34
Justice Douglas was joined in dissent by Justices Marshall and
Brennan. 5 He believed that the "so-called jurisdiction acts" had
occurred in Indian country. 6 The Indians had been granted a
"permanent reservation" with boundaries defined by an 1867
treaty. There was no evidence that the reservation boundaries had
been altered or that the jurisdictional acts had taken place outside
them. 7
28. United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973); DeCoteau
v. District County Court, 87 S.D. 555, 211 N.W.2d 843 (1973).
29. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
30. Id. at 428.
31. Id. at 438, 442.
32. Id. at 445.
33. Id. at 446.
34. Id. at 447.
35. 1d. at 460.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 460-61.
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The Court majority acknowledged that the alleged wrongful
acts leading to the original custody dispute had occurred either on
non-Indian patented land or on Indian allotments over which the
state had no jurisdiction." The state claimed that the transgres-
sions happened on the non-Indian unallotted land "within the ex-
terior boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation" as established
by the 1867 treaty. 9 The section 1151 definition of Indian coun-
try would appear to have included the aforementioned land con-
sidering the following language: "[Indian country includes] all
land within thie limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent."4
The DeCoteau ruling must be viewed against the background
of the political situation in South Dakota in the mid-1970s. In-
dians had occupied the town of Wounded Knee and had con-
fronted FBI agents only a few months before the original state
supreme court decision. Outspoken South Dakotans had formed
a political organization called the Tri-County Protective Associa-
tion in response to the activities of militant Indians in the state.
The group's members were opposed to the extension of Indian
rights. 4 ' Finally, the controversy involved only 3,000 Indians who
were matched against 30,000 non-Indians. Given the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case, the High Court's disposition of
it can be readily understood.
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
In this case, an Indian who operated a smoke shop on reserva-
tion land in Montana was arrested by state officials for failure to
possess a cigarette retailer's license and for selling unstamped
cigarettes. The businessman brought suit, contending that the
state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him.42 Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for a unanimous Court, held that the state did not have
any of the following powers: "a. to impose a personal property
tax on property within the reservation owned by Indians; b. to
impose a vendor's license fee on reservation Indians doing busi-
ness for the tribe within the reservation; c. to collect a cigarette
38. Id. at 429 n.3.
39. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 87 S.D. 555, 211 N.W.2d 843, 844 (1973).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) (emphasis added).
41. INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 1, at 8.
42. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
sales tax on reservation sales by Indians to other Indians." '43 The
state did have the authority to require the businessman to add the
state tax to cigarettes sold to non-Indians, however."
The tribe argued that requiring its members to add the sales tax
to purchases by non-Indians from Indians would impose "a mea-
surable out-of-pocket loss" on the Native American retailers."
The High Court rejected the tribal argument, adopting the state's
position that non-Indian consumers were reaping the benefits of a
tax exemption by purchasing the cigarettes on the reservation.",
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the tribal members were enjoying
a competitive advantage based on the commission of misdemean-
ors by non-Indians."7 Forcing Indians to aid the state in the col-
lection of a tax was a "minimal burden" on the tribal seller,
Rehnquist concluded."
The Supreme Court in Williams had ruled that reservation In-
dians were to be allowed to "make their own laws and be ruled
by them.""9 Moe appears to have been contradictory to that
teaching. Native Americans could be required to act as agents of
the state by adding a tax from which they would receive no future
benefits. In the decision, then, the Indians were neither making
their own laws nor being ruled by them.
The political situation in Moe, as in DeCoteau, seems pertinent
to the result. A pressure group called Montanans Opposed to Dis-
crimination had organized in 1974 in the vicinity of the Flathead
Reservation occupied by the Salish and Kootenai tribes. Organi-
zation members were opposed to any extension of tribal rights af-
fecting jurisdiction over non-Indians.5 0 Additionally, as the table
indicates, more than four times as many whites as Indians lived in
the area directly affected by the decision.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip
The High Court ruled that certain acts of Congress had reduced
the boundaries of the Great Sioux Indian Reservation. s" Justice
43. Id. at 480-81.
44. Id. at 481-82.
45. Id. at 481.
46. Id. at 480-81.
47. Id. at 482.
48. Id. at 483.
49. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
50. INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 1, at 7.
51. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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Rehnquist spoke for the Court once more, stating that congres-
sional intent would be decisive to the ruling. He further declared
that the Mattz test would be appropriate in determining whether
such intent was present in past legislative acts. 2
An 1868 treaty established the reservation. In 1889 an act of
Congress reduced the reservation by 50%. An amendment to the
act was not ratified by the tribe in 1901. The unratified amend-
ment provided for cession of 416,000 acres of unallotted land in
Gregory County for the sum of $1,040,000.11 The Sioux contended
that, absent ratification by the required three-fourths majority,
and absent a fixed-sum provision in later acts, Congress had not
acted to diminish the reservation boundaries.5 4
Justice Rehnquist had a different perspective:
[W]e conclude that although the Acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910
were unilateral Acts of Congress without the consent of three-
quarters of the tribe required by the original Treaty, that fact
does not have any direct bearing on the question of whether
Congress by these later Acts did intend to diminish the reserva-
tion boundaries. 5
Even though the Court claimed to have adopted the Mattz test,
the majority did not feel bound by the prior ruling. 6 "[T]hat
such express language in an act [was] the only method by which
congressional action may result in disestablishment [was] quite in-
consistent" with Mattz, said Justice Rehnquist." The Court then
found "an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment" in
the unratified agreement of 1901. 58
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stewart. He noted that the Court had concluded in a prior deci-
sion that opening an area to homesteading was not necessarily in-
consistent with continued reservation status.5 9 Additionally, in
the case at hand, the High Court had not applied liberal construc-
tion to the treaty nor strict construction to the acts as expected
under the general rules of Indian law. 60
52. Id. at 586.
53. Id. at 590-91.
54. Id. at 587.
55. Id.
56. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.23 (1973).
57. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 588 n.4 (1977).
58. Id. at 592.
59. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
60. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 617 (1977).
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The legislative history of the acts was "extraordinarily sparse,"
in Justice Marshall's view. Furthermore, Congress had demon-
strated an "almost complete lack" of interest in the boundary
issue.61 There was "confusion" and "indifference" about the im-
plication of the acts, but there was certainly no clear intent to ter-
minate the reservation.62
The Rosebud Sioux decision failed the Mattz test in toto. The
face of the acts was not clear; the legislative history was brief and
lacking in substance; and the surrounding circumstances were at
least inconclusive on the depth of congressional intent to reduce
the boundaries. Traditional canons of Indian law were not ap-
plied despite the involvement of a treaty. A partial explanation
for the ruling may be political.
Following the 1973 Indian occupation and siege of Wounded
Knee, local citizens formed a political pressure group. 3 The
members of the organization, mostly ranchers who lived near the
Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation, carried "citizens band radios and
their own weapons," said a recent study.64 The Tri-County Pro-
tective Association later joined with another group that had
organized near the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation to form the
South Dakotans for Civil Liberties in the mid-1970s. 6' The anti-
Indian backlash continued when the South Dakota committee
merged with other groups to form the Interstate Congress for
Equal Rights and Responsibilities (ICERR). 66
The Rosebud Sioux decision directly affected about 1,600 In-
dians and 16,000 whites. 67 Given the relative numbers of the par-
ties to the suit and the formation and activities of anti-Indian
organizations in South Dakota, the final resolution of the case is
not surprising.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
Two non-Indians were arrested and charged with violating
tribal laws on the Port Madison Reservation in Washington state.
61. Id. at 626, 629.
62. Id. at 629-30. For a critique of the decision, see Case Developments, Indian
Land Claims-A Question of Congress' Right to Unilaterally Abrogate Indian Treaty
Provisionrs: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Richard Kneip, 21 How. L.J. 625 (1978).
63. L'DIAN TRIBES, supra note 1, at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 88 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975).
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One of the defendants allegedly assaulted a tribal officer and
resisted arrest. The other was charged with driving at an excessive
speed that caused reckless endangerment to others. 68 Both of the
accused sought writs of habeas corpus. They argued that the tribe
was without authority to try them for the offenses. Justice Rehn-
quist, speaking for a 6-2 majority, held that tribal Indian courts
do not have "inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-
Indians.''69
The reservation was established as a result of the Treaty of
Point Elliott in 1855.70 At the time of the United States Supreme
Court ruling, nearly 3,000 non-Indians lived on the reservation
along with about 50 members of the Suquamish Tribe.7' Justice
Rehnquist described the reservation as "a checkerboard of tribal
community land, allotted Indian lands, property held in fee sim-
ple by non-Indians, and various roads and public highways." ' 72
The Suquamish were not alone in the assumption of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation at the time of the
decision. Of 127 tribal court systems, 33 had assumed such
jurisdiction by the late 1970s. 73 Noting that no previous ruling on
the issue had been handed down in the history of the Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "it was apparently
assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to
that effect." ' 74 The earliest treaties had contained language sug-
gesting that Indians may have had criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indian offenders, but later treaties lacked such language. Justice
Rehnquist did not believe that the early treaty provisions lent
significant support to the tribe's position. 7
In ruling against the tribe, the Court appeared to violate basic
tenets of Indian law. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Con-
gress had never expressly forbidden Indian tribes to impose
criminal sanctions on non-Indians.76 He also construed the mean-
ing of the treaty to the benefit of the white majority rather than
68. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
69. Id. at 212.
70. 12 Stat. 927 (1855).
71. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978).
72. Id. at 193.
73. Id. at 196.
74. Id. at 197.
75. Id. at 197-98 n.8.
76. Id. at 204.
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to that of the tribe." For example, Rehnquist noted that the
treaty was silent as to tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians and ruled against extending treaty rights to the Native
Americans in the case at bar.78 In contrast, the High Court had
decided in favor of protecting hunting and fishing rights in
Menominee even though the treaty under review did not refer to
the rights at all." In the hunting and fishing rights case the Court
appropriately applied the canons of Indian law; in Oliphant, it
did not.
The Oliphant ruling directly contradicted Williams in at least
two important respects. Williams states in part that: "[i]f the
crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that
expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained ex-
clusive." 8 Oliphant's alleged offense was against a tribal officer.
Additionally, the Court itself acknowledged that Congress had
never expressly prohibited application of tribal law to non-Indian
offenders. The opinion contained no evidence that Congress had
ever conferred jurisdiction for crimes against Indians upon state
courts.
Williams also concluded that the state could not impose laws
that "infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves."'I
The Oliphant ruling actually favored infringement of important
tribal rights. An important recent study commented as follows on
Oliphant:
This issue [tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians] had
been a highly emotional and controversial one on and near
Indian reservations and a significant factor in the development
of organizations such as the South Dakotans for Civil Liber-
ties. The majority opinion, with its dicta concerning the rights
of non-Indians, was greeted as a major victory for the
"backlash" point of view.82
Oliphant originated from Washington state, the state where the
ICERR was founded in the mid-1970s. Organized anti-Indian
activities were common in the state during the years immediately
preceding the Court ruling. 83 The relative numbers of the contend-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 206.
79. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
80. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
81. Id. at 223.
82. INDtAN TRIBES, supra note 1, at 12.
83. Id. at 71.
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ing parties to the suit would not appear to have been irrelevant to
the decision either. Apparently the numerical weight of 3,000
non-Indians was more important to the Justices than the mere
legal weight of treaty rights for 50 Indians.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation
On a direct appeal from federal district court rulings in com-
panion cases from Washington state,84 the Supreme Court
reversed.8" Justice White spoke for a six-member majority that
upheld application of a state tax on the purchase of cigarettes by
non-Indians from Native American retailers on the reservation."
In Justice White's view, the critical issue was preemption.
Could a tribe deprive a state "from any power to tax on-reser-
vation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its own
tax on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues from the
tribal business"? 8 7 The answer was no. Neither the Indian
Reorganization Act, the Indian traders statutes, the Indian com-
merce clause, nor prior treaties could be used to exempt the tribes
from these taxes. 8 The Justice reasoned that even though both
tribal and state governments would be taxing cigarette sales on
the reservation, there would be "no direct conflict between the
state and tribal schemes, since each government [would be] free
to impose its taxes without ousting the other."8 9
Because tribal sellers heretofore had been exempt from applica-
tion of the state sales tax on cigarettes, they had profited from a
price advantage on their retail sales to non-Indians on the reser-
vation. Tribal revenue was likely to shrink considerably if the tax
exemption ended. As Justice White stated: "All parties agree that
if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops and
eliminate that $1 saving, the stream of non-Indian bargain
hunters would dry up." 90 The fact that the tribes would lose
substantial revenue for "essential governmental services, includ-
84. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F.
Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978); United States v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D.
Wash. 1978).
85. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
86. Id. at 136-37.
87. Id. at 138.
88. Id. at 155-57.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Id. at 145.
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ing programs to combat severe poverty and underdevelopment
[on] reservations" was not relevant.' "Moe makes clear that the
Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-
Indians, or indeed to any such sales at all," said Justice White.9"
Application of the state tax to on-reservation cigarette sales
meant that the tribes would be given a Hobson's choice: keep the
tribal tax but risk heavy losses for Indian retailers, or drop the
tribal tax and lose substantial revenue for tribal government. 3
The prior competitive advantage for Indian sellers would be
turned into a competitive disadvantage if each tribe retained its
tax. What non-Indian purchaser would come onto the reservation
and pay double taxes on cigarettes?
The Court's interpretation of tribal sovereignty in Colville
sharply contrasts with its prior elucidation of the concept in such
leading cases as Worcester v. Georgia-(1832) and Williams v. Lee
(1959).9" In Colville, Justice White said that: "The principle of
tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent
sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accom-
modation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the
other." 91
In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall presented his view:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of Congress.96
As previously indicated, a unanimous Court in Williams ruled
that a state would have jurisdiction only "where essential tribal
relations" were not involved. 7
The Colville Court acknowledged that affected tribes would
lose substantial sums of money for "essential governmental ser-
vices" as a direct result of its ruling. 98 An alleged "accom-
91. Id. at 154.
92. Id. at 151 n.27.
93. Id. at 170-71.
94. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959).
95. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
96. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560.
97. Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.
98. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
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modation" between state and tribal interests to the distinct dis-
advantage of the tribes is clearly inconsistent with Indian law
doctrine on tribal sovereignty.
If the Court's rationale cannot be squared with its prior
holdings, how might one explain its decision? As with Oliphant,
the Colville cases originated in the state of Washington. The state
is well known to be the home of anti-Indian groups such as the
ICERR. Numerous demonstrations against the extension of rights
to Native Americans occurred in Washington during the years
immediately prior to the Colville decision.99 Additionally, the
numerical contrast should be noted. As the table indicates,
approximately 10,000 Native Americans were directly affected by
the ruling compared with 24,000 whites.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
The state of Arizona required the Pinetop Logging Company
to pay a motor carrier license tax and also imposed a use fuel tax
upon the company. The business consisted of two non-Indian
corporations that operated only on the Fort Apache Reserva-
tion."'0 Speaking for a 6-3 majority, Justice Marshall held that
the state did not have authority to impose either the license tax or
the fuel tax on the company.'
At the outset, Justice Marshall noted that more than 90% of
the tribe's annual profits were earned by timber operations, in-
cluding those of the logging company.' Additionally, fifty tribal
members worked for the business.0 3 The state motor carrier
license tax was equal to 2.5% of the carrier's gross income and
the fuel tax was eight cents a gallon."0 '
There were two potential arguments against the state's asser-
tion of authority in the case. First, the authority may have been
preempted by federal law under Warren v. Arizona Tax Commis-
sion.' The Supreme Court had ruled in Warren that federal
regulations affecting reservation Indians may effectively preempt
imposition of overlapping state laws. Second, the state may have
99. INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 1, at 71-73.
100. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1980).
101. Id. at 151.
102. Id. at 138.
103. Id. at 139.
104. Id. at 139-40.
105. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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unlawfully infringed on the right of reservation Indians to govern
themselves. 06
The preemption argument prevailed. There were already
detailed regulations by the Secretary of the Interior governing the
harvesting and selling of timber. Similar regulations applied to
use of the highways. Justice Marshall concluded that the federal
regulatory scheme was "so pervasive as to preclude the additional
burdens sought to be imposed in this case."'0 7
The state had argued the reverse side of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Oliphant. Whereas in Oliphant the Court held that the
tribe had no jurisdiction unless there was an express congres-
sional statement conferring that authority, the state argued in
White Mountain Apache that Arizona would have jurisdiction
unless expressly negated by Congress. 08 The argument was
"simply not the law," said Justice Marshall.'0 9
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission
In a companion case," ' the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that a
state tax on the sale of farm machinery to reservation Indians was
not valid. The seller neither resided on the reservation nor was
licensed to trade with Indians.'"
Justice Marshall, again speaking for the Court, held that
federal laws preempted state jurisdiction in the situation. Con-
gress passed a 1790 statute that regulated trade with Indians. The
law "comprehensively regulated trade with Indians," said the
Justice." I2
The only differences between the case at bar and Warren, in
Marshall's view, were that the appellant was not a licensed trader
and he did not maintain a permanent place of business on the
reservation.' These factors were considered irrelevant by the
Court. "Until Congress repeals or amends the Indian trader
statutes, however, we must give them 'a sweep as broad as [their]
language,"' concluded Justice Marshall.' 4
106. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
107. Id. at 148.
108. Id. at 150-51.
109. Id. at 151.
110. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
111. Id. at 161.
112. Id. at 163.
113. Id. at 164.
114. Id. at 166.
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In both White Mountain Apache and Central Machinery, the
Court found the reasoning used in Warren dispositive. Tradi-
tional concepts of tribal sovereignty were fundamental to the
decision in Warren."1 5 In that case Justice Black quoted Wor-
cester to the effect that: " 'The treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate[d] the Indian territory as completely separated
from that of the states .... , ,,116
In addition to the fact that both decisions were clearly in the
tradition of Indian law canons, two other factors are noteworthy:
(1) the cases both originated in Arizona, a state where organized
anti-Indian groups have not gained prominence; (2) the tribal
members directly affected in each decision outnumbered non-
Indian residents of their reservations by a wide margin, as the
table indicates.
Montana v. United States
The state of Montana appealed an adverse ruling by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals granting the Crow Tribe jurisdictional
rights over fishing in the Big Horn River." 7 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed." 8
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, rejected the tribal
claim to jurisdictional rights over fishing."1 9 The Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1851 provided that the Crow "[would] not surrender
the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts
of country" described in the treaty.' 20 The 1868 treaty, which
established the Crow Reservation, described the land as 'set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the
Indians,"' said Justice Stewart.' 21 The Justice believed that even
supposing the second treaty "created tribal power to restrict or
prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, that
power [could] not apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians."' 22
The Crow retained certain rights as an aspect of their
sovereignty. However, stated Justice Stewart: "[E]xercise of
115. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965).
116. Id., quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
117. United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont. 1978), rev'd 604 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
118. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
119. Id. at 557-60.
120. Id. at 558.
121. Id., quoting from 15 Stat. 649 (1868) (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 559.
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tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation.112 3 Regulation of hunting and
fishing of non-Indians by the tribes did not bear a "clear rela-
tionship to tribal self-government," he concluded. 12
4
The Court's decision in Montana rejected claims of tribal
sovereignty even though two treaties were involved. The Fort
Laramie Treaty made specific reference to hunting and fishing
rights.' 2 Furthermore, the Crow Treaty of 1868 provided for the
"absolute and undisturbed use" of the land by the tribe.' 26 Con-
ferring state jurisdiction over treaty land under the conditions
present in Montana appears contradictory both to the canons of
Indian law and to what would appear to be the most impartial
deductions from the treaty language.
The Crow's loss in Montana does not fall readily to extralegal
analysis. The case did originate in a state where organizations
hostile to the extension of Indian rights had been active in the
years immediately preceding the ruling.' 27 However, the relative
numerical strengths of the contending parties within the reserva-
tion would have suggested a victory for tribal government.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
On an appeal from a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling
approving a tribal tax on oil and natural gas extracted from reser-
vation lands, 128 the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 6-3.
Justice Marshall spoke for the Court. 29
The Court held that (1) the tribe had the "inherent power",to
impose the tax; (2) the tax was "an essential attribute of Indian
sovereignty"; (3) nonmembers who entered tribal territory were
subject to the tribe's power to exclude them. The power to ex-
clude non-Indians "necessarily" included the power to place a
tax on business as a condition of entry. 30
123. Id. at 564.
124. Id. .
125. Id. at 558.
126. Id.
127. "Montanans Opposed to Discrimination," Interstate Congress for Equal Rights
and Responsibilities (ICERR).
128. Menion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd.
129. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
130. Id. at 137, 140, 144.
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In an expansive justification of the severance tax, Justice Mar-
shall identified the source of the tribe's power: "The power does
not derive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-
Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing govern-
11131mental services ... .
Justice Stevens (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehn-
quist) issued a dissenting opinion diametrically opposed to the
majority's interpretation of tribal sovereignty. "Tribal sovereignty
is neither derived from nor protected by the Constitution," said
the Justice.' 32 Furthermore, "[i]n sharp contrast to the tribe's
broad powers over their own members, tribal powers over non-
members have always been narrowly confined," Justice Stevens
commented. '31
The Jicarilla Apaches' right to impose a tax on major oil com-
panies was based on the tribe's "general authority, as sovereign,
to control economic activity within its jurisdiction," in the words
of Justice Marshall.134 The rights to generate income for essential
services or to regulate fishing by non-Indians on treaty-held land
could not be granted to some Indian tribes even when others had
the general authority to tax major oil companies and make a con-
siderable amount of money. 3 Unlike Colville and Montana, the
Jicarilla decision followed the original concept of tribal
sovereignty developed by Chief Justice Marshall.
Jicarilla can be understood in its political context as well. The
2,100 members of the tribe live on a sparsely populated reserva-
tion in northwestern New Mexico.' 6 Few whites live within the
reservation boundaries. 3 7 Organized anti-Indian groups have not
been conspicuous in New Mexico in recent years.
Conclusion
The decisions examined in this article suggest that the United
131. Id. at 137.
132. Id. at 168.
133. Id. at 171.
134. Id. at 137.
135. See Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The Jicarilla would gain an estimated $2
million annually from imposition of the severance tax in the opinion of Circuit Judge
Logan, 617 F.2d at 539-40.
136. Jicarilla, 450 U.S. at 134.
137. Sacramento Bee, Jan. 26, 1982, at A12.
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States Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its application of
traditional concepts of tribal sovereignty to jurisdictional disputes
between state and tribal governments. The hypothesis, stated
supra, that judicial policy in Indian law involving jurisdiction
reflects the comparative numerical strength of the persons directly
affected by the rulings, is supported by the data. In ten of eleven
(91%) of the cases examined here the results were consistent with
the hypothesis.
The correlation between the results in the Court decisions and
political activities in the 1970s is also quite close. Between 1959
and 1973, Native Americans won five straight unanimous deci-
sions on important jurisdictional issues at the United States
Supreme Court. 3 ' Between 1975 and 1980, however, the situation
was completely reversed. Five critical rulings were made and in
each instance the Indians lost.'39 The era of anti-Indian decisions
corresponded with the growth of organizations hostile to tribal
rights in northwestern and Rocky Mountain states. Considerable
antagonism toward Native Americans erupted in the wake of the
siege and occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973. The historic vic-
tory for Indian rights in the Boldt decision of 1974 then became
the catalyst for the development of the national anti-Indian
organization, the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and
Responsibilities. 140
It would take a certain amount of temerity to claim that one
has "explained" any group of rulings, let alone Indian law deci-
sions that seem rife with inconsistencies. The hypothesis tested
here may only prove to be a heuristic device for others attempting
to make sense of a series of decisions for which no logical ex-
planation is readily apparent.
138. See Williams (1959), Seymour (1962), Warren (1965), McClanahan (1973), and
Mattz (1973).
139. See Decoteau (1975), Moe (1976), Rosebud Sioux (1977), Oliphant (1978), and
Colville (1980).
140. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
[Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss2/3
